Compounding Crises: Bolivia in 2020 by Velasco Guachalla, V Ximena et al.







Compounding Crises: Bolivia in 2020*1
Crisis-Doble: Bolivia 2020
V. XIMENA VELASCO GUACHALLA 
University of Essex, United Kingdom
CALLA HUMMEL 
University of Miami, United States
JAMI NELSON-NUÑEZ 
University of New Mexico, United States
CAREW BOULDING 
University of Colorado Boulder, United States
ABSTRACT
Bolivia began 2020 in the midst of a political crisis, with an interim administration 
led by Jeanine Añez, who assumed power during the political crisis that ended the 
administration of Evo Morales in November 2019. On March 10th, the government 
identified Bolivia’s first COVID-19 case. The administration’s swift initial response 
was marred by corruption, a strained public health system, and resistance from 
citizens and politicians. This essay focuses on the unprecedented character of a 
double crisis in Bolivia: a health crisis preceded and aggravated by a political cri-
sis. The crises put the Bolivian government under intense pressure. The thrice-re-
scheduled presidential elections on October 18th returned the Movimiento al So-
cialismo (MAS) to power with a decisive victory under the leadership of former 
finance minister Luis Arce Catacora and former foreign minister David Choque-
huanca. We review the consequences of the year’s events on human and economic 
development and conclude by anticipating future challenges.
Keywords: crisis, polarization, legitimacy, COVID-19, elections.
RESUMEN
Bolivia inició el 2020 en medio de una crisis política, con una administración interina lide-
rada por Jeanine Añez, quien asumió el poder durante la crisis política que terminó con la 
administración de Evo Morales en noviembre de 2019. El 10 de marzo, el gobierno identifi-
có el primer caso de COVID-19 en Bolivia. La rápida respuesta inicial de la administración 
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de Añez se vio empañada por casos de corrupción, un sistema de salud pública inadecuado 
y la resistencia de ciudadanos y políticos. Este ensayo se enfoca en el carácter sin preceden-
tes de una doble-crisis en Bolivia: una crisis de salud, precedida y agravada por una crisis 
política. Las crisis presionaron intensamente al gobierno boliviano. Las elecciones presiden-
ciales del 18 de octubre, tres veces reprogramadas, devolvieron el poder al Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS) con una victoria decisiva bajo el liderazgo del exministro de Economía y 
Finanzas Públicas, Luis Arce Catacora, y del excanciller, David Choquehuanca. Revisamos 
las consecuencias de los acontecimientos del año en el desarrollo humano y económico y 
concluimos anticipando los desafíos futuros.
Palabas clave: crisis, polarización, legitimidad, COVID-19, elecciones.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bolivia began 2020 in the midst of a political crisis. Amid widespread protest 
and allegations of election fraud, President Evo Morales resigned in November 
2019 after nearly 14 years in office (Wolff 2020). When Bolivia’s vice president 
and the leaders of the senate and lower house resigned, Jeanine Añez, the sec-
ond vice president of the senate, was sworn in as an interim president. The early 
months of her administration were characterized by heavy repression against 
anti-government protests. Over thirty people died when the police opened fire 
on protesters in the departments of La Paz and Cochabamba (Clandestina 2019; 
Diaz-Cuellar 2019). Bolivians entered 2020 questioning the integrity of Bolivian 
democracy, the legitimacy of the Añez government and the legacy of Morales 
(Derpic 2019; Mamani 2020).
By any measure, 2020 was on course to be a monumental year in Bolivia’s po-
litical history as the country reckoned with the uncertain future of democracy 
and a divided population. The COVID-19 pandemic layered public health and 
economic crises onto the political crisis. On March 10th, 2020, the government 
identified Bolivia’s first COVID-19 case in Oruro, closely followed by cases in 
Santa Cruz and Cochabamba (Hummel et al. 2020). The Añez administration 
reacted quickly by closing schools, cancelling events, shutting borders and 
imposing a national lockdown on March 22nd. The administration’s swift re-
sponse was marred by corruption, a strained public health system, and resis-
tance from wary citizens and politicians (Velasco-Guachalla et al. 2021). De-
spite early action, the virus spread through under-supplied hospitals, crowded 
homes, and busy food markets.
This essay emphasizes the unprecedented nature of the year’s overlapping and 
compounding crises. First and foremost, the pandemic was a human tragedy 
on an unprecedented scale. The deaths of more than 25,000 Bolivians (Karlin-
sky and Kobak 2021) and the grief of their families cannot be minimized. The 
scale and severity of the public health crisis also served as a crucible for the in-
terim government, putting all aspects of the Bolivian government under pres-
sure and revealing a great deal about the current state of the political system. 
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Bolivians vented their frustrations with their leaders through protests across 
the country and at the ballot box. The thrice-rescheduled presidential elections 
on October 18th returned the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) to power with 
a decisive victory under the leadership of former finance minister Luis Arce 
Catacora and former foreign minister David Choquehuanca.
In order to make sense of this historic year, this essay focuses on the context of 
the political crisis that was underway when the pandemic hit and how it influ-
enced the course the pandemic took. The essay is organized in four parts. First, 
we lay out a timeline of 2020, with attention to the unfolding political drama 
around the contested legitimacy of the Añez government and the public health 
crisis of the pandemic. Second, we discuss the ways that the political crisis 
shaped the pandemic response, health policy, and the spread of COVID-19 cas-
es and deaths. Third, we consider how the timing and severity of the pandemic 
changed the political crisis, putting tremendous stress on the political system 
and reshaping the general election. Finally, we review the consequences of the 
year’s events on human and economic development and conclude by antici-
pating the challenges ahead.
II. WHAT HAPPENED IN 2020
January-March: Ongoing Political Crisis
The year began amid profound questions about the legitimacy of the Añez 
administration and with heightened polarization between supporters of the 
interim government and its detractors.1 Although Bolivia’s polarization pre-
cedes the entry of Añez, it increased dramatically after the political crisis of 
2019 and continued throughout 2020. The new administration rolled out a se-
ries of warrants, detained hundreds of MAS supporters (Achtenberg 2020) and 
announced that nearly 600 former administration officials were under investi-
gation for corruption (Ariñez 2020).
Uncertainty proliferated about who would run and what coalitions could be 
forged or kept before the presidential elections, initially scheduled for May. 
High-profile debates swirled around potential names for the MAS ticket, with 
MAS factional politics inside and outside of the country regularly making 
headlines. Morales took refuge in the large Bolivian community around Bue-
nos Aires and held forums in exile about potential candidates, which reflected 
how intertwined the party had become with the leadership of Evo Morales (Los 
Tiempos 2019). However, while Morales continued to enjoy widespread sup-
port from MAS militants, his departure revealed pronounced divisions within 
1 We refer to polarization around the legitimacy of the government and develop what that means and its 
implications for Bolivia in other work (Velasco-Guachalla et al 2021).
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the party. The younger, newer, urban MAS faction revolved around La Paz, El 
Alto, and the emerging leadership of student activist and senate president Eva 
Copa. Meanwhile, the older, rural, coca grower MAS faction mobilized in the 
Chapare region of Cochabamba and united behind the emerging leadership of 
Andrónico Rodríguez. High profile MAS officials, like former finance minis-
ter Luis Arce and former foreign minister David Choquehuanca, maneuvered 
for leadership. Party divisions materialized around the selection of the pres-
idential ticket for the 2020 elections when competing MAS factions publicly 
announced different tickets. A faction announced its preference for the Cho-
quehuanca-Andrónico duo while others backed Arce-Choquehuanca (Mealla 
2020). In January, an assembly in Buenos Aires led by Morales nominated the 
latter option, and former finance minister Luis Arce and former foreign minis-
ter David Choquehuanca became the presidential and vice presidential candi-
dates for the party. The decision angered some party leaders who had pushed 
for alternative options (Los Tiempos 2020a).
Meanwhile, despite stating on several occasions that she would not run for 
president, Añez announced her candidacy on January 24th (Guarachi 2020). 
With this addition, there were nine preliminary opposition candidates. In the 
cancelled 2019 elections, former interim president Carlos Mesa had cobbled 
together a shaky coalition under the Comunidad Ciudadana (CC) ticket and 
emerged as the first viable challenger to Morales and the MAS since the 2005 
elections, which Mesa’s administration had overseen (Wolff 2020). Mesa con-
tinued to campaign in 2020 under the CC banner. However, he was easily up-
staged by younger far-right figures who grabbed media attention during the 
2019 political crisis, namely Luis Fernando Camacho and later his vice pres-
idential candidate Marco Pumari. Camacho gained international attention 
in 2019 as the leader of the Santa Cruz Civic Committee by leading protests 
against Morales, often with a Bible in hand, and cultivating a track record of 
inflammatory statements. During the protests, he swore that he was uninter-
ested in the presidency. But in early 2020, he launched a presidential bid with 
a newly-created Christian right party, Creemos, and Marco Pumari, the head 
of the Potosí Civic Committee, as his running mate. Despite calls from various 
civil society groups, including the National Committee for the Defense of De-
mocracy (CONADE) among others, for the opposition to form a united front 
against the MAS (Montero 2020), the Bolivian opposition once again failed to 
create a united electoral coalition and instead returned to the fractured field 
that has characterized Bolivian opposition parties since the inception of the 
MAS (Valencia 2009; Madrid 2012).
Añez’s candidacy in a crowded field of presidential hopefuls further con-
vinced many Bolivians that her administration was not functioning as an in-
terim caretaker government. The administration’s retaliatory actions against 
former MAS officials were reminiscent of persecution under the Morales ad-
ministration (Muñoz Acebes 2020). Her government was also quick to intro-
duce symbolic policy changes, like tearing down statues of Morales (Flores 
2020). The Añez administration was also criticized for attacks against free-
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dom of expression. Two high profile cases illustrated a concerning pattern 
of antagonism towards the press and critics. First, barely a month after Añez 
assumed the presidency, journalists Orestes Sotomayor and Alejandra Salinas 
were arrested and charged with sedition against the state for running news 
stories critical of Bolivia’s interim government (Chauvin and Faiola 2020). 
Second, as part of the response to COVID-19, the interim government adopt-
ed policies that threatened freedom of expression, including an overly broad 
provision of an emergency decree that authorities could use to prosecute crit-
ics of government policies (Human Rights Watch 2020). These actions, among 
others, deepened political divisions.
March-May: COVID-19 Lockdown
After the confirmation of the first COVID-19 cases in March, the Añez admin-
istration issued an emergency order that closed schools, cancelled events, and 
restricted gatherings. In a series of emergency decrees, the administration can-
celled flights, imposed curfews, and by March 22nd had sealed its borders and 
imposed one of the region’s strictest national lockdowns (Hummel et al. 2020).
Bolivia was one of the countries that was least prepared for the pandemic (Es-
calera-Antezana et al. 2020). In March 2020, Bolivia had only 35 functioning 
ICU beds and the department of Pando did not have a third-level hospital, 
which under the Bolivian health care system is equipped to treat complex ill-
nesses (Ministerio de Salud y Deportes de Bolivia 2019). Several other depart-
ments, including Beni and Tarija, had only one hospital of this kind. Public 
health spending per capita hovered around $200 USD, far below the region-
al average of $1320 USD per capita (Pan American Health Organization 2017; 
Hummel et al. 2020). Bolivia had no national or robust subnational contact trac-
ing program and almost immediately faced shortages of diagnostic tests and 
personal protective equipment.
Despite early action from the national government, COVID-19 continued to 
spread through Bolivia. Bolivians returning from Europe seeded initial out-
breaks in Oruro, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz. Other departments confirmed 
their first cases soon after: La Paz on March 19th, Potosi on March 26th, Chuqui-
saca on March 27th, Pando on March 28th, and Tarija on March 30th. Santa 
Cruz became the country’s first epicenter with dozens and then hundreds of 
cases a day, despite strict lockdowns. Beni was the last department to confirm 
a case, on April 20th, but quickly became the country’s second epicenter as the 
department’s minimal health system collapsed in May under an overwhelming 
wave of infections. Beni’s governor declared a health disaster and emergency 
in the department due to the rapid spread of the virus (Agencia Boliviana de 
Información 2020).
The Añez government’s response stalled in scandal, implementation, and 
noncompliance. The government pledged to use the lockdown to bolster the 
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healthcare system. Instead the administration found itself embroiled in cor-
ruption scandals about health equipment as whistleblowers revealed that bu-
reaucrats had pocketed millions while buying faulty ventilators (Kitroeff and 
Taj 2020). The scandal led to the removal of the then-health minister Marcelo 
Navajas and an investigation, which had not concluded at the time of this writ-
ing. In addition to the acts of corruption, the health ministry underwent three 
changes in leadership: the former health minister, Anibal Cruz, resigned from 
his position in April, and was replaced by Marcelo Navajas who in turn was 
replaced by Eidy Roca. The corruption cases and several ambitious hospital 
construction projects that fell behind schedule and budget damaged what little 
legitimacy the interim government had before the pandemic. An IPSOS poll 
showed that support for Añez dropped from 69 to 46 percent following the 
ventilators scandal (Brujula Digital 2020).
Various local governments faced their own crises of authority. Because the 2019 
elections were repealed, the government passed a law extending the constitu-
tional mandate of several public officials including the president, the assem-
bly members and local elected officials until new authorities could take office 
following new elections (Constitutional Declaration 001 2020). The outset of 
the pandemic further prolonged the mandate of authorities when the elector-
al calendar was cancelled in March 2020 (Erbol 2020). While legally allowed 
to remain in power, the authority of several local officials was challenged in 
the middle of the health crisis. Demonstrations across several departments and 
municipalities demanding the resignation of the interim president and several 
mayors and governors continued throughout the year.
Bolivians chafed under one of the most restrictive lockdowns in the world. Un-
der National Decree N4199 only one person per family could make minimum 
and essential trips in the morning from 07:00 am to 12:00 noon once a week, 
and only to stock up on necessary products and supplies in the vicinity of their 
home or residence (Ministerio de la Presidencia 2020a). Misinformation spread 
through WhatsApp and other social media platforms (Jimenez Pereyra 2020) 
and people in several departments broke quarantine to protest the lockdowns, 
corruption, health supply shortages, as well as the administration indefinitely 
postponing local and national elections. Demonstrations around the underpro-
vision of health equipment were a constant through 2020 whereas election-re-
lated protests were at their highest frequency and duration in early August 
(Velasco-Guachalla et al. 2021).
June-August: The first peak
In the face of widespread discontent and growing noncompliance, the Añez 
administration passed National Decree N4245, which imposed a “conditional 
and dynamic” quarantine. Unlike the initial national lockdown, the 4245 de-
cree gave authority over COVID-19 policy to subnational governments (Min-
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isterio de la Presidencia 2020b). From this point forward, a large part of the re-
sponsibility in the fight against COVID-19 fell on departmental and municipal 
authorities as they were tasked with determining contingency plans and set-
ting their own regulations. Some departments decided to keep strict lockdown 
rules (Santa Cruz and Tarija) while others loosened restrictions by imposing 
fixed working hours and allowing citizens to go out according to the last digit 
of their identity card (La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro). The national government 
continued to mandate the closure of schools and borders, a national informa-
tion campaign, the prohibition of events and crowds of people, and the manda-
tory use of face masks across the country (Ministerio de la Presidencia 2020b).
As restrictions loosened, cases started to increase, leading to Bolivia’s first peak 
in June and July. Figure 1 tracks cases per 100,000 people in each department 
from March 10th to December 31st, 2020. People died en masse during the first 
peak. Between July 15th and 20th, the country’s Special Force against Crime 
carried out the legal removal of at least 420 corpses in five departments of the 
country (Peñaranda A. 2020). Hospitals closed down in the middle of outbreaks 
in nearly every department because staff were too sick to come to work. By 
September, the Ministry of Health reported that 80% of hospital workers had 
tested positive for COVID-19 and hundreds had died (Agencia Boliviana de In-
formación 2020). As hospitals shut down, cemeteries and funeral services could 
not bury bodies fast enough. In a uniquely Bolivian solution, informal and unli-
censed mobile crematoriums filled in, cremating bodies in neighborhoods.
Figure 1. Daily confirmed COVID-19 cases per 100,000 residents by 
department, March 10th to December 31st, 2020.
Potosi Santa Cruz Tarija
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*The black line charts daily confirmed COVID-19 cases in Bolivia’s nine departments. Dashed lines mark the 
date of important changes to national health policies. Source: Daily case reports from the Bolivian Ministry of 
Health, collected and analyzed by authors.
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In the midst of the first peak, national elections initially scheduled for May 3rd 
were postponed on three different occasions (Cusicanqui 2020). While the first 
delays were agreed upon by a consensus of all political parties, the postpone-
ment to October 18th was rejected by the MAS and its supporting organizations 
in civil society. The disagreement led to massive demonstrations that paralyzed 
the country for two weeks in late July and early August (Huarachi 2020). Hun-
dreds of MAS supporters, community groups, and others blocked roads and 
highways throughout the country. With the protests came roadblocks, political 
violence, food and fuel shortages, the deaths of COVID-19 patients and panic 
in hospitals due to the lack of oxygen tanks that did not get through major 
highway blockades (Carrillo 2020). After almost two weeks of mass demonstra-
tions, top MAS party members acknowledged the October 18th date change. 
Despite this concession, protests continued as factions within the MAS, pre-
dominantly workers and peasant unions, rejected the agreement. After days 
of protests, and left without the support of top party leaders, these factions 
eventually recognized October 18th as election day (Molina 2020a).
September-October: Campaigns and elections
On September 1st, the administration further relaxed restrictions. Every Boliv-
ian was required to wear a mask, distance, and disinfect, but work resumed in 
nearly all sectors. The Ministry of Education decided to cancel the 2020 school 
year and pass all students, which parents and students criticized. Local trans-
portation and internal travel picked up, and limited international travel began. 
Many local governments retained curfews and other restrictions. The Septem-
ber 1st policies did not lead to an increase in cases and cases trended down to 
less than 100 per day by November.
Salvador Romero, a widely respected expert on election administration, re-
vamped the Electoral Tribunal (TSE) after the 2019 political crisis and elector-
al fraud allegations and organized the 2020 election process. The government 
approved a short six week campaign window for the national elections, and 
on September 6th, political organizations were allowed to start campaigning. 
However, due to COVID-19, several departments banned mass gatherings and 
rallies, which encouraged the use of virtual platforms (Los Tiempos 2020b; 
Melendres Galvis 2020). Social media sites became important dissemination 
tools for political parties (Ortiz 2020). Furthering this trend, opposing political 
supporters and party militants clashed at in-person events (Amurrio Montes 
2020b; Paredes Tamayo 2020; Zuazo 2020).
When electoral campaigns launched in early September, four political parties 
dominated the electoral landscape: MAS, Comunidad Ciudadana, Juntos, and 
Creemos. The MAS presidential ticket was filled with high profile MAS of-
ficials, with former finance minister Luis Arce as the presidential candidate 
and former foreign minister David Choquehuanca as his running mate. Arce, 
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widely known as “Lucho,” is a technocrat who is credited with Bolivia’s eco-
nomic success during Morales’s early administrations. Choquehuanca came up 
through indigenous social and political movements and then forged an inter-
national reputation as Foreign Minister. Following the MAS divisions of 2019, 
Choquehuanca emerged as a conciliatory leader within the party.
Carlos Mesa Gisbert and Gustavo Pedraza led Comunidad Ciudadana as presi-
dential and vice presidential, respectively. Mesa Gisbert, a widely known histo-
rian, journalist, and politician, served as president from 2003 to 2005 following 
the resignation of then-president Gonzalo “Goni” Sanchez de Lozada during 
the political crisis of 2003. Pedraza is a lawyer, university professor, and politi-
cian who served as Minister of Sustainable Development and Planning during 
Mesa’s government. The Comunidad Ciudana ticket was the most competitive 
bid against the MAS in the 2019 and 2020 elections.
The presidential ticket for Juntos was the interim president, Jeanine Añez. Her 
vice president was Samuel Doria Medina, a businessman and politician who 
had previously ran for the presidency in 2004, 2009, and 2014. While the Añez 
administration and candidacy had initial support, the mismanagement of the 
pandemic, together with corruption scandals, undermined this initial backing 
(Brujula Digital 2020). A July voter intention poll put the Juntos duo in third 
place with 13.3% of the vote, and on September 17th, Añez withdrew from the 
presidential race in order to strengthen opposition to the MAS and avoid divid-
ing the vote (Alanoca Paco 2020a).
The last competitive campaign came from Luis Fernando Camacho and Mario 
Pumari on the newly created Creemos ticket. Camacho is a right-wing opposi-
tion leader and former president of the Santa Cruz Civic Committee. He gained 
international recognition as one of the main opposition figures leading the pro-
test against Morales during the 2019 political crisis. Pumari, the former presi-
dent of the Potosí Civic Committee, similarly led opposition to Morales in 2019 
in the department of Potosí. While Creemos led the polls in Camacho’s home 
department of Santa Cruz, national forecasts in July and October gave the pair 
only 9.1% and 12.5% of the vote respectively (Brito et al. 2020).
On October 18th, Bolivia held a nationwide in-person election with compul-
sory voting. Despite the health crisis, the elections were orderly, transparent, 
and did not become a superspreader event. The MAS ticket decisively won the 
presidential elections with 55.11% of the vote, higher than forecasted, followed 
by Comunidad Ciudadana with 28.82% and Creemos with 14% (Órgano Elec-
toral Plurinacional 2020). Although some protests took place denouncing elec-
toral fraud and demanding recounts, the demonstrations were small and did 
not parallel those that took place in 2019. Moreover, international organizations 
and observers endorsed the elections and losing candidates conceded defeat in 
the days following the results (Correo del Sur 2020b; Los Tiempos 2020c; Mas-
sud Lozada 2020; Peredo 2020).
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Arce-Choquehuanca won and returned the MAS to power for many reasons. 
Chief among these were the interim administration’s mismanagement of the 
pandemic, the extant recession and Arce’s successful record of economic man-
agement, and a disorganized and divided opposition. We briefly address each 
of these in turn. First, the handling of the pandemic by the Añez administration 
was strongly criticized as inadequate given the country’s informal workforce 
and economic situation. Moreover, the early efforts of the administration were 
soon tarnished by corruption cases around the provision of medical equipment 
for the pandemic (Kitroeff and Taj 2020). Second, Arce’s record as the chief 
economist during Bolivia’s economic boom from 2006 to 2019 provided a point 
of reference for voters in a country where the pandemic had a profound nega-
tive impact on the national economy and people’s livelihoods (Molina 2020b).
A final key factor for understanding the MAS victory lies with the opposition, 
which could not provide a realistic alternative to Arce’s party. Añez joined a 
small opposition party, had not previously belonged to or led a large coalition, 
and lacked ties with large civil society organizations. Meanwhile, although Mesa 
was the strongest competitor against the MAS, he was unable to reach voters be-
yond the middle-class and present a convincing alternative to indecisive voters 
(Molina 2020b; Peñaranda R. 2020; Stefanoni 2020). Camacho was a controversial 
figure who was unable to reach many voters outside his native Santa Cruz.
November-December: The MAS Returns to Power
While the MAS ticket won the executive, the party lost its imposing two-thirds 
majority in the senate, which had allowed the party to govern for more than 
a decade without building a multiparty governing coalition or compromising 
with the opposition (Amurrio Montes 2020a; Correo del Sur 2020a).
Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca assumed the presidency and vice pres-
idency on November 8th, 2020. Arce’s inauguration was marked by protests 
over changes made by the previously MAS-controlled senate to lower the ma-
jority needed to pass certain legislation, arguably to continue its dominion over 
legislation despite having just lost its two-thirds majority (Corz 2020a; Opinion 
2020; Ramos 2020). A looming question was the new administration’s relation-
ship with Morales, as both Arce and Choquehuanca had publicly announced 
they would distance the administration from the former president. Choque-
huanca had been critical of Morales on several occasions, particularly after the 
2016 constitutional referendum, and had made calls for renovation within the 
party before and after taking the vice presidency (Chuquimia Huallpa 2020; In-
fobae 2020; Pagina Siete 2020). While the administration’s first couple of months 
pointed to a healthy distance from Morales, whether or not this prevails in the 
months to come remains an open question (Ferreyra Peñarrieta 2020).
A year after having fled the country, first to Mexico and then to Argentina, 
Evo Morales returned to Bolivia on November 9th. He was accompanied by 
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the president of Argentina, Alberto Fernandez, and was received by hundreds 
of MAS supporters at the border (Alanoca Paco 2020b; Los Tiempos 2020d). 
Soon after his return, on November 17th, Morales assumed the presidency of 
the MAS and began making preparations for the March subnational elections, 
including the selection of candidates (Corz 2020b). Meanwhile, the new admin-
istration embarked on undoing the Añez administration’s policies. While sub-
national governments retained authority over COVID-19 policy, Arce repealed 
past emergency decrees regarding COVID-19 on December 1st. On that date, 
National Decree N4404 came into effect, lifting almost all existing restrictions 
at the national-level and emphasizing instead the use of biosecurity measures 
including the mandatory use of masks and frequent handwashing. The decree 
also incentivized the use of traditional medicine for preventing and treating 
COVID-19, gave greater responsibility to various ministries, and required PCR 
tests for all international arrivals (Ministerio de la Presidencia 2020c). Several 
municipal and department governments retained or imposed stricter policies 
and all departments imposed restrictions for Christmas and New Year celebra-
tions. The year concluded with the beginning of a second spike, which by the 
start of February 2021 far exceeded the July 2020 peak of cases.
III. HOW THE POLITICAL CRISIS SHAPED THE HEALTH CRISIS
It is unsurprising that an interim government in the midst of a major national 
political crisis struggled to respond to an unprecedented public health crisis. 
Unfortunately, the particulars of the Bolivian political crisis of 2019-2020 made 
an effective public health response even more difficult than one might have ex-
pected based on state capacity alone. Low government legitimacy and extreme 
partisan polarization led to uneven compliance with public health orders, con-
tributing to unequal case and death patterns across the country (see Figures 1 
and 2). The interim government also lacked deep connections to many of the 
groups in civil society that were important allies to the previous government, 
making consensus-building around policy more difficult, especially for poorer 
communities and people working in the informal sector.
Low Legitimacy and Political Polarization
The political crisis put severe stress on Bolivia’s already weak social assistance and 
public health infrastructure. During the thirteen years of Morales’s administration, 
the government ramped up state support for citizens through direct cash transfers, 
broad redistributive policies, and state spending but only marginally improved 
Bolivia’s roads and hospitals (Hunter and Brill 2016; Farthing 2019; Niedzwiecki 
and Anria 2019). The Añez administration attempted a strong response using the 
central government power and infrastructure that the MAS helped develop but 
faltered in its delivery due to internal fractures as well as widespread noncompli-
ance, misinformation, and resistance from MAS supporters (CIDES-UMSA 2019; 
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Blofield and Filgueira 2020; Velasco-Guachalla et al 2021). In contrast, countries 
that had pre-existing public health and social assistance infrastructure seem to 
have had advantage in imposing lockdowns, tracing outbreaks, and treating cases 
(Blofield et al. 2020). As a result, the pandemic spread unevenly and unequally 
across the Americas (Filgueira et al. 2020; Hummel et al. 2021).
The Añez administration attempted to govern in a country that was extremely 
divided over whether the government was legitimate at all, with one side see-
ing a government that came to power through a coup, bent on violently undo-
ing the legacy of Evo Morales and the MAS. On the other side, supporters saw 
a government that had narrowly managed to avoid a full scale constitutional 
crisis or, worse, a violent civil conflict with uncertain ends (Velasco-Guachalla 
et al. 2021). It is difficult to exaggerate the depth and intensity of these compet-
ing views. The population consolidated around two political orientations: MAS 
supporters and those against the MAS (Arequipa Azurduy 2020). These vying 
perspectives materialized in pro- and anti-government protests that turned vi-
olent on several occasions after the inauguration of the interim government 
in 2019 (Derpic 2019). As the pandemic unfolded, these competing views also 
became evident in debates around national COVID-19 policy between the Añez 
interim administration and the MAS-dominated legislature. The relationship 
between the interim executive and the legislature was characterized by an evi-
dent lack of consensus on public health policies. Two illustrative cases include 
the approval of IMF credits for health stimulus checks and the use of chlorine 
dioxide. On the later, the MAS-dominated legislature enacted a law promoting 
chlorine dioxide as a treatment for COVID-19, rejecting recommendations from 
the Añez-appointed Minister of Health and against the advice of the Bolivian 
and international scientific community (Velasco-Guachalla et al 2021).
Subnational authorities faced a legitimacy crisis of their own in various de-
partments and municipalities when part of the population refused to recog-
nize their mandates in the absence of elections. Political polarization between 
the national and subnational governments resulted in the politicization of the 
health crisis. This in turn weakened incentives for compliance, cooperation, 
and coordination in public policy implementation. Politicized compliance and 
coordination then led to worse outcomes in terms of cases and deaths, and ex-
acerbated pre-existing inequalities (Velasco-Guachalla et al 2021).
Devastating and Unequal Loss of Life
Polarization around the government’s legitimacy politicized reactions to 
COVID-19, contributing to the pandemic’s uneven impact across Bolivia’s 
departments and municipalities. We and other researchers suggest that parti-
sanship — along with pre-existing health infrastructure and wealth — largely 
explain the uneven spread of infections (Acuña at el 2020; Escalera-Antezana 
et al. 2020; Hummel et al. 2020; Velasco-Guachalla et al 2021). Wealthier de-
partments generally had lower case counts and deaths per 100,000 than poorer 
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departments. We find that governors and groups of citizens aligned with the 
Añez administration followed strict national decrees more closely and for lon-
ger periods of time than governors and citizens that were opposed to the Añez 
administration (Velasco-Guachalla et al 2021).
Departments and municipalities that opposed the Añez administration protested 
more and returned to work and public transportation faster than areas that were 
aligned with the administration (Velasco-Guachalla et al 2021). News media re-
ported that some officials who opposed Añez denied the existence of the virus 
and spread misinformation, while citizens in their jurisdictions were more likely 
to medicate with ineffective or dangerous substances (Trigo, Kurmanaev, and 
Cabrera 2020). Thus while there was a strong national response to the COVID-19 
pandemic, subnational political fault lines precluded a unified response.
Clearly, the loss of life in Bolivia is the most devastating consequence of the 
pandemic hitting the country during a complex political crisis. We are still 
struggling to fully comprehend the scale of the loss, as official statistics likely 
undercount the true number of deaths. The toll of the pandemic in Bolivia was 
enormous by all measures available. Overall mortality data show that 79,018 
people died in Bolivia in 2020, a 50% increase compared to an average of 52,130 
annual deaths between 2016 and 2019 (Trigo, Kurmanaev, and McCann 2020; 
Karlinsky and Kobak 2021). Figure 2 tracks the number of people who died 
each month on average between 2016 and 2019 (black line) and the number of 
people who died in 2020 (red line).






















*The black line charts average monthly deaths between 2016 and 2019. The red line charts reported monthly 
deaths from all causes during 2020. Note that the offices that record deaths closed for several weeks in March 
and April 2020, accounting for the red line’s brief dip. Source: Mortality reports from the Bolivian Civic Registry 
Service (SERECI), collected by the New York Times.
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The Bolivian government officially attributed 9,162 deaths in 2020 to COVID-19, 
roughly a third of the 26,888 excess deaths over the year. These deaths hit de-
partments unevenly, with Pando, Beni, Chuquisaca, and Oruro experiencing 
more deaths per 100,000 residents than larger and better resourced depart-
ments. Most of these are also the departments that were not supportive of the 
interim government and lacked trust in government policies (Hummel et al. 
2020). Figure 3 tracks confirmed COVID-19 deaths per 100,000 people in each 
department from March 10th to December 31st, 2020.2
Figure 3. Daily confirmed COVID-19 deaths per 100,000 residents by 
department, March 10th to December 31st, 2020.
Potosi Santa Cruz Tarija
La Paz Oruro Pando
Beni Chuquisaca Cochabamba


























*The black line charts daily confirmed COVID-19 deaths in Bolivia’s nine departments. The dashed lines mark 
the date of important changes to national health policies. Source: Daily mortality reports from the Bolivian 
Ministry of Health, collected and corroborated by the authors.
At a minimum, the political crisis precluded a more unified and effective pan-
demic response, resulting in a devastating death toll. The interim government 
led by Jeanine Añez lacked the popular legitimacy necessary to lead a country 
through such a health crisis. Unfortunately, the uneven distribution of cases 
and deaths overlapped with poverty and weak state capacity, further dividing 
the country and worsening the health crisis.
2 During this time, Bolivia faced an extreme shortage of COVID-19 tests and positivity rates hovered around 
50%, far above the 5% level that the WHO recommended. Additionally, the state recorded a death as due to 
COVID-19 only if a person received a positive test before they died. It is likely that Bolivia experienced one of 
the highest death rates per capita in the world during June and July (Trigo, Kurmanaev, and McCann 2020). 
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IV. HOW THE PANDEMIC AFFECTED BOLIVIAN POLITICS
The health crisis put an unprecedented amount of stress on the political system 
at an already difficult moment. It may be years before we truly understand 
the impact of the decisions, losses, and political turns that occurred during the 
pandemic. The pandemic affected the course of political mobilization at a time 
when it is likely that, without a strict lockdown, political tensions would have 
played out in the streets. The pandemic also changed what was possible for 
the Añez government and the prospects for the MAS to regain power. Finally, 
it is likely that the pandemic will have lasting consequences for democracy in 
Bolivia, particularly in terms of polarization and trust in institutions.
Protest and Mobilization
Bolivians organize more than people in most other societies and Bolivians’ 
responses to the crises of 2020 reflected this: Bolivians continued to protest 
throughout lockdown, defying national quarantine laws and in some cases 
local pandemic orders that explicitly prohibited protest (Boulding 2014, Vel-
asco-Guachalla et al. 2021). According to our own tally from news and social 
media, between March and September of 2020, Bolivia witnessed 1138 protest 
events. The demonstrations clearly illustrated the compounding health and po-
litical crises as the two dominant protest demands centered around elections 
and the provision of health supplies and working conditions for health work-
ers. Beyond these top two issues, protest demands included the loosening of 
COVID-19 restrictions, economic concerns, education, and the resignation of 
public officials.
Recall that in the absence of the global pandemic Bolivians would have gone to 
the ballot box to elect a new president on May 3rd. Faced with the health emer-
gency and a growing number of confirmed cases, the Supreme Electoral Court 
in concert with political organizations decided to postpone general elections 
until September 6th. The further delay of the electoral process to October 18th 
was met with strong opposition from MAS supporters, who organized massive 
demonstrations that paralized the country for two weeks. These anti-govern-
ment demonstrations were countered by pro-government groups, or civilian 
groups that claimed to be acting in the country’s best interest (Aguilar 2020). 
Protesters of all political affiliations broke lockdown restrictions.
While demonstrators used common mobilization and protest tactics, such as 
road blockades and marches, the pandemic provided grounds for innovation. 
Several civil society groups organized stay-at-home protests where demonstra-
tors banged on pots and pans from windows and balconies — organizers had 
used these protest tactics before but they became much more popular during 
Bolivia’s nationwide lockdown. Many groups used social media platforms to 
hold virtual town meetings and protests to voice a wide range of demands.
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Legacies of the MAS
In the absence of the pandemic, 2020 likely would have been a year defined by 
contention over the legacy of the MAS, the role of the interim government, and 
the new presidential elections. The MAS, under the leadership of Evo Morales, 
had governed Bolivia since 2005, the longest administration in Bolivia’s dem-
ocratic history. During this time, the Bolivian government changed in form, 
function, and scope (Anria 2018). Voters approved a new constitution, which 
changed electoral laws, the administration renamed and reorganized most 
government agencies, and state spending on social programs, infrastructure, 
and education increased (Niedzwiecki and Anria 2019). The Añez government 
was the first new administration to take control of a government that had been 
rebuilt by the MAS.
The pandemic served as a high-intensity stress test of the MAS’s legacy and Bo-
livian government capacity: could the government function without the MAS 
in power? Our assessment is mixed. The investments in social assistance and 
infrastructure during the MAS years put the government in a better position 
than it might have otherwise been in, but it is also clear that those investments 
were insufficient bulwarks against a pandemic. It is likely that the crisis of the 
pandemic, and the associated policies have also made it more difficult to assess 
how well the government was functioning. Offices were closed, communica-
tion between civil society organizations and government was more difficult, 
and people’s attention was focused on survival.
Consequences for democracy
Bolivians and observers have voiced concerns over the health of the country’s 
democratic institutions for years (Anria 2016; Centellas 2018; Farthing 2019). 
Many of these criticisms were aimed at the ways in which the MAS had limited 
competition and consolidated power. The contested transition to an interim 
government, followed by the pandemic, raised worries that the public health 
crisis might be used as an excuse for Añez to delay elections and stay in power 
undemocratically. The initial delay of the elections that had been scheduled 
for May 2020 fueled these fears. As the crisis unfolded, however, and her gov-
ernment continued to lose popularity, it became clear that she was not going 
to stay in power indefinitely. The counterfactual is unclear: under easier cir-
cumstances would an interim government have been able to consolidate more 
support? By the time new elections were held, the interim government had 
little support from the public or from other political parties aligned against the 
MAS, paving the way for the MAS to win the presidential elections in the fall.
More broadly, the pandemic further weakened citizens’ trust in state institu-
tions. Pre-existing weak capacity in the health and education sectors gave way 
to the collapse of health systems across the country and the cancelling of the ac-
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ademic year as the pandemic worsened. Under these conditions, citizens found 
their own means to fight the disease and self-medicate. This in turn damaged 
even further the little trust that citizens had in the country’s health system. Sur-
vey data from the Instituto de Investigaciones Socio-económicas de la Universi-
dad Católica Boliviana (IISEC-UCB) showed that individuals who reported no 
trust in the health system in Bolivia increased from 32.4% to 36.7% and those 
who reported trust in the health system decreased from 6.2% to 0.5% between 
the third and ninth week of quarantine (Wanderley et al. 2020). The pandemic 
also put corruption center stage, with a major scandal involving top govern-
ment officials and the provision of much needed health supplies.
V. IMPACT ON HUMAN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The year resulted in a number of setbacks for the economy and social welfare. 
As the global economy ground to halt during the first months of the pandem-
ic, an economic crisis compounded problems for Bolivian families. The year 
marked the end to an era of growth that began in 2004, culminating in a 8% 
loss in GDP. The country’s total debt reached $19.38 billion USD in June 2020, 
having nearly quadrupled since 2007 (Fundacion Jubileo 2020). Moreover, as a 
consequence of COVID-19, net international reserves at the Central Bank of Bo-
livia decreased by 25% in the first four months of 2020 (Churata Tola 2020). The 
impact of lockdown restrictions on work was severe: unemployment almost 
doubled in less than six months from 4.8% at the end of 2019 to 8.1% in May 
2020 and 11.8% by the end of July (INE 2021). Poverty increased by 10% in the 
first three months of lockdown (INE 2021).
As poor Bolivians and informal workers suffered more than wealthier Bolivi-
ans, the pandemic undermined years of progress against inequality. People lost 
income as a result of the economic crisis, and more joined the informal work-
force, a sector already exceptionally large relative to other countries (Hummel 
2017; Hummel et al. 2021). Many departmental and municipal pandemic laws 
classified informal agricultural, transportation, and market workers as essential 
and permitted them to continue working during lockdown. However, workers 
did not have adequate access to personal protective equipment or training and 
initial reports suggest that markets and transportation routes spread the virus 
(IIES-JOM 2020). Market and transportation workers reported much higher 
rates of COVID-19 infections than the general population. The pandemic hit 
poorer and more informal neighborhoods and departments, like Beni and Pan-
do, harder than wealthier ones.
In addition to the staggering loss of life and likely continuing burden for Bo-
livians of long-haul COVID-19 complications, the pandemic deeply impacted 
other indicators of human development, especially in education. The transition 
to virtual education in March laid bare the absence of educational infrastruc-
ture necessary for online learning, including limited internet connectivity, in-
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adequate access to digital devices and a deficit of skills for the digital age in 
both teachers and students (UNICEF 2020; Agetic 2021;). Finally, on August 
2nd, the interim government proceeded to cancel the academic year, a measure 
that sparked controversy and criticism from various sectors of society and even 
international organizations (Luna 2020).
While the interim government distributed cash transfers as a way to alleviate 
the economic burden imposed on households by the pandemic, the approval of 
the cash programs was characterized by lack of consensus, its distribution faced 
difficulties, and its benefits, while important, remained limited. As mentioned 
earlier, the clash between the interim executive and the legislature resulted in 
a lack of consensus on public health policies. This included the disagreement 
over the approval of IMF credits for the health stimulus checks. While the Añez 
administration advertized the cash bonus as aid for Bolivians, the MAS-led 
legislature as well as other political parties, including Comunidad Ciudadana 
and Creemos, claimed the interim president had politized the monetary aid 
and was using the programs to campaign (Corz and Aguirre 2020). The govern-
ment extended cash assistance to those who were already beneficiaries of cash 
transfer programs in late March and expanded transfers to more households of 
unprotected workers (Ministerio de la Presidencia 2020d). However, aid distri-
bution drew crowds of people and long lines outside of banks, which increased 
the risk of COVID-19 exposure (Hinojosa 2020; Los Tiempos 2020e). Finally, the 
program created to mitigate the pandemic-related economic crisis, the “Bono 
Universal” for people over 18 who are not working, provided limited and tem-
porary help, since over 70% of working Bolivians do not have contracts or em-
ployer-based social security (Baker et al 2020).
VI. CHALLENGES AHEAD
While political and health crises characterized 2020 for many countries across 
the Americas, the conflict and suffering was particularly acute in Bolivia. How-
ever, 2020 included some encouraging developments. Salvador Romero re-
vamped the Electoral Tribunal and the October 2020 national elections were 
orderly, transparent, free, and fair. Looking ahead, we identify three core chal-
lenges for Bolivians and Bolivia’s political leaders in the coming years: polar-
ization, power sharing within the MAS and across political parties, and trust 
in institutions.
Polarization has been on the rise in the country since 2016, but it became par-
ticularly acute following the political crisis of 2019 and persisted throughout 
2020. In contrast to the pro-democracy movements in the past, the alignment of 
diverse civil society groups along the MAS/anti-MAS divide in 2020 subsumed 
many pro-democracy groups. Groups protesting on different sides believed 
themselves to be champions of democracy, interpreting events in the country 
through a lens of motivated reasoning and acting with strikingly different vi-
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sions of what matters most for democracy. At the same time, discontent and 
fatigue increased with the political confrontation between opposing sides (El 
Potosi 2021). Even though civil society groups continue to support the ideals 
of the democratic political system (Boulding and Nelson-Nuñez 2014), there 
is a marked distrust of political actors from all political parties, as both Mo-
rales and Áñez initially declared that they were not going to run for office only 
to break their word shortly after. While the recent conflicts between opposing 
views paint a gloomy picture for the country, there is reason for optimism. A 
recent study found that the country is not as severely polarized as currently 
believed, but it is more than desired (Laserna 2020). The authors suggest that 
current polarization in the country is closely related to elections, which have 
been viewed as a method to resolve conflicts.
Challenges remain for the MAS. Both the political crisis of 2019 and the par-
ty’s re-election to the executive in 2020 opened old cracks and created new 
rifts within the party. A key challenge is the process of determining the MAS 
leadership. The inability of the party to incubate and support emerging leaders 
could yield a viable left-wing alternative to the MAS. These divisions and pow-
er struggles were on display throughout 2020 and in the March 2021 subna-
tional elections, where MAS lost in major cities and former strongholds like El 
Alto, La Paz, and Cochabamba. Party members attribute the loss to top-down 
appointment of candidates, which disregarded input from the bases (Claros 
2021; Los Tiempos 2021; Mamani Cayo 2021; Quisbert 2021). Divisions have 
been so vitriolic that key political figures split from the party and formed their 
own, garnering considerable support in former MAS strongholds. The recent 
election of Eva Copa as mayor of El Alto despite her split with Evo Morales and 
the MAS is the latest iteration of this dynamic (Farthing 2021).
Declining trust in institutions preceded the pandemic and has continued to 
wane while dissatisfaction with political parties has grown. Data from the 2019 
LAPOP household survey show that 81.26% of respondents do not identify 
with a political party and nearly 40% of respondents said they would submit 
a null ballot in the next election (LAPOP 2019). Low trust in political parties, a 
key nexus between citizens and governments, rose from roughly 40% in 2010 
to over 50% in 2019. More recently, a survey by IPSOS for the Unión Nacional 
de Instituciones para el Trabajo de Acción Social shows the disaffection of the 
population with all political parties: when asked “How do you rate the par-
ticipation of each of the following actors during the conflict in October and 
November?” on a scale from 1 to 7 (1-appalling and 7-excellent), 53% and 51% 
of respondents gave a score between 1-3 to the Morales administration and 
opposition political parties respectively (Unión Nacional de Instituciones para 
el Trabajo de Acción Social 2020). Additionally, when asked “How would you 
rate the current political role of each of the following actors?” 67% and 68% of 
respondents gave a score between 1-3 to the MAS and other political parties 
respectively. This evidence suggests that rebuilding trust in the political system 
will be a central challenge in the years ahead.
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Reforming the justice system is key to rebuilding trust in institutions. Be-
tween 2014 and 2019, individuals reporting “no trust at all” in the judicial 
system increased from 14 to 20 percent respectively (LAPOP 2019). Citizens’ 
lack of trust is rooted in the country’s persistently dysfunctional justice sys-
tem, which is characterized by a lack of resources, extensive corruption, and 
judicial misconduct. Moreover, the judiciary has become a political weapon: 
administrations across the political spectrum strategically deploy the law 
against their political opponents (Weyland 2013). The recent charges leveled 
against former members of the interim government, including the incarcer-
ation of Añez, are reminiscent of the politicized use of the law under both 
the Morales and Añez administrations. While Arce announced reforms to the 
justice system soon after his inauguration, the process is now stalled (Minis-
terio de Justicia 2020; Segales 2020; Erbol 2021). Like other polarized contexts 
or democracies in crisis, the rule of law should be a focal point in the coming 
years. Countries will not be able to adjudicate the entrenched views that fuel 
conflict — who is corrupt, what is democratic — without a truly independent 
and respected judicial system.
REFERENCES
Achtenberg, Emily. 2020, 10 January. “MAS Party Under Threat as Bolivia Moves Towards 
New Elections (Without Evo).” NACLA. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://nacla.
org/blog/2020/01/10/mas-party-under-threat-bolivia-new-elections-without-evo.
Acuña, Jose, Lykke E. Andersen, Luis Gonzales. 2020. “Datos Territoriales para la gestion de 
la pandemia: el caso del covid-19 en Bolivia”. Revista Lajed (34):7-33
Agencia Boliviana de Información. 2020. “Beni declara desastre sanitario por la propagación 
del coronavirus COVID-19.” Retrieved April 2, 2021 from https://www1.abi.bo/
abi_/?i=450221.
Agetic. 2021, 21 April. “AGETIC y UNICEF firman acuerdo de cooperación para generar 
políticas y acciones en favor de las niñas, niños y adolescentes respecto a su acceso a 
las TICs.” Agencia de Gobierno Electronico y Tecnologias de Informacion y Comu-
nicacion, Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, Retrieved July 19, 2021 from agetic.gob.
bo/#/acuerdo-agetic-unicef.
Aguilar, Wilson. 2020, 19 August. “Grupos armados, discordia en el MAS y el retorno de 
Mallku en los conflictos.” Los Tiempos. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://www.
lostiempos.com/especial-multimedia/20200819/grupos-armados-discordia-mas-re-
torno-mallku-conflictos.
Alanoca Paco, Jesus Reynaldo. 2020a, 24 January. “Jeanine Áñez: ‘He Tomado La Decisión de 
Presentarme Como Candidata a Las Elecciones Nacionales.’” El Deber. Retrieved July 
8, 2020 from https://eldeber.com.bo/usted-elige/jeanine-anez-he-tomado-la-deci-
sion-de-presentarme-como-candidata-a-las-elecciones-nacionales_163817.
Alanoca Paco, Jesus Reynaldo. 2020b, 9 November. “Evo Morales Cruza La Frontera y Re-
torna a Bolivia Después de Un Año.” El Deber. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://
eldeber.com.bo/pais/evo -morales-cruza-la-frontera-y-retorna-a-bolivia-despues-
de-un-ano_208021.
Amurrio Montes, Lorena. 2020a, 22 October. “El MAS Acaricia La Victoria Oficial, Pero 
No Logra Dominar El Senado.” Los Tiempos. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://
www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20201022/mas-acaricia-victoria-oficial-pe-
ro-no-logra-dominar-senado.
COMPOUNDING CRISES: BOLIVIA IN 2020
231
Amurrio Montes, Lorena. 2020b, 6 October. “Se Incrementa La Violencia En Campañas Elec-
torales.” Los Tiempos. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://www.lostiempos.com/ac-
tualidad/pais/20201006/se-incrementa-violencia-campanas-electorales.
Anria, Santiago. 2016. “Delegative Democracy Revisited: More Inclusion, Less Liberalism in 
Bolivia.” Journal of Democracy 27(3): 99–108.
Arequipa Azurduy, Marcelo. 2020. “Polarización a la Boliviana.” In Polarización y Conflicto: 
Midiendo los Riesgos de la Violencia, edited by Roberto Laserna. La Paz, Bolivia: Edi-
ciones Ceres Press, 43-51.
Ariñez, Rubén. 2020, 8 January. “Gobierno Investiga a 592 Exautoridades Del Gobierno de 
Morales Por Presunto Desvío de Bienes.” La Razón. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from 
https://m.la-razon.com/nacional/2020/01/08/gobierno-investiga-a-592-exautori-
dades-del-gobierno-de-morales-por-presunto-desvio-de-bienes/.
Baker, Andy, Sarah Berens, Germán Feierherd, and Irene Menéndez González. 2020. Labor 
Informality and Its Political Consequences in Latin America. Nashville: Latin American 
Public Opinion Project. Retrieved July 16, 2021 from http://www.optiononetelecom.
com/lapop/insights/IO944en.pdf.
Blofield, Merike, Cecilia Giambruno and Fernando Filgueira. 2020. Policy Expansion in Com-
pressed Time: Assessing the Speed, Breadth and Sufficiency of Post-COVID-19 Social Pro-
tection Measures in 10 Latin American Countries. Santiago: Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Blofield, Merike and Fernando Filgueira. 2020. Covid-19 and Latin America: Social Impact, Pol-
icies and a Fiscal Case for an Emergency Social Protection Floor. Buenos Aires: Cippec.
Boulding, Carew. 2014. NGOs, Civil Society, and Political Protest. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Boulding, Carew and Jami Nelson-Nuñez. 2014. “Civil Society and Support for the Political 
System in Times of Crisis.” Latin American Research Review 49(1): 128–54.
Brito, Gisela et al. 2020. Panorama Político y Social Bolivia. Buenos Aires: CELAG. Survey 
Summary. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://www.celag.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2020/07/panorama-politico-y-social-bolivia-web-2.pdf.
Brújula Digital. 2020, 27 May. “IPSOS: Antes del caso respiradores, el 69% de la población 
calificaba positivamente a Añez, ahora su aprobación es del 46%.” Brujula Digital: 
Política. Retrieved July 9, 2021 from https://www.brujuladigital.net/politica/ipsos-
antes-del-caso-respiradores-el-69-de-la-poblacion-calificaba-positivamente-a-anez-
ahora-su-aprobacion-es-del-46
Carrillo, Liliana. 2020, 10 March. “Agosto 2020: bloqueos obstruyeron paso de oxígeno en 
plena crisis.” Página Siete. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://www.paginasiete.bo/
sociedad/2021/3/10/agosto-2020-bloqueos-obstruyeron-paso-de-oxigeno-en-ple-
na-crisis-286909.html.
Centellas, Miguel. 2018. “Bolivia En 2017: Rumbo a La Incertidumbre.” Revista de ciencia 
política (Santiago) 38(2): 155–79.
Chauvin, Lucien and Anthony Faiola. 2020, March 6. “As the U.S.-Backed Government in Bo-
livia Unleashes a Wave of Political Persecution, the Trump Administration Remains 




Chuquimia Huallpa, Marco Antonio. 2021, 23 January. “Choquehuanca Lanza Otro Dardo a 
Evo Morales Sobre El Poder Político.” El Deber. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://
eldeber.com.bo/pais/choquehuanca-lanza-otro-dardo-a-morales-sobre-el-poder-po-
litico_216900.
Churata Tola, Rogelio. 2020. Economía Tras la Pandemia del COVID-19: Efectos sobre el 
Comercio Exterior, las Inversiones y los Servios. Umbrales 36: 143-170.
CIDES-UMSA. 2019. Professors in La Paz Call on International Academics to Prioritize Peace, Rec-
onciliation. Mexico City: Toward Freedom. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from http://to-




Clandestina, Chaski. 2019. Report from the Funeral Procession from Senkata to La Paz. Mexi-
co City: Toward Freedom. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from http://towardfreedom.org/
wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Toward-Freedoms-Bolivia-Reader.pdf.
Claros, Lucero. 2021, 3 March. “Anuncian ‘voto castigo’ contra el MAS en Colcapirhua por 
‘dedazo.’” Los Tiempos. Retrieved April 6, 2021 from https://www.lostiempos.com/
actualidad/pais/20210303/anuncian-voto-castigo-contra-mas-colcapirhua-dedazo.
Correo del Sur. 2020a, 21 October. “El MAS Pierde Los 2/3 En El Senado y Asoma Equilibrio En La 
Asamblea.” Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://correodelsur.com/politica/20191021_
el-mas-pierde-los-2-3-en-el-senado-y-asoma-equilibrio-en-la-asamblea.html.
Correo del Sur. 2020b, 19 October. “Mesa Reconoce La Victoria Del MAS: ‘La Diferencia Es 
Amplia.’” Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://correodelsur.com/politica/20201019_
mesa-reconoce-la-victoria-del-mas-la-diferencia-es-amplia.html.
Corz, Carlos. 2020a, 28 October. “En Cuatro Ciudades Protestan Contra La Anulación de 
Los 2/3 En El Legislativo.” La Razón. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://www.
la-razon.com/nacional/2020/10/28/en-cuatro-ciudades-protestan-contra-la-anula-
cion-de-los-2-3-en-el-legislativo.
Corz, Carlos. 2020b, 17 November. “Morales Asume La Presidencia Del MAS Rumbo a Las 
Subnacionales.” La Razón. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://www.la-razon.com/
nacional/2020/11/17/morales-asume-la-presidencia-del-mas-y-anuncia-que-el-sa-
bado-definira-estrategia-hacia-las-subnacionales/.
Corz, Carlos and Liliana Aguirre. 2020, 13 September. “Áñez Usa Discurso Para Hacer Cam-
paña; El MAS y CC La Denunciarán Ante El TSE.” La Razón. Retrieved July 8, 2021 
from https://www.la-razon.com/nacional/2020/09/13/anez-usa-discurso-para-
hacer-campana-el-mas-y-cc-la-denunciaran-ante-el-tse/.
Cusicanqui, Juan José. 2020, 30 April. “Senado Sanciona Ley Que Da Plazo de 90 Días Para 
Las Elecciones Generales.” La Razón. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://www.la-ra-
zon.com/nacional/2020/04/30/senadores-mas-ley-elecciones-generales/.
Derpic, Jorge C. 2019, 30 November. “Bolivia after Morales: Power Struggles and Shifting Al-
liances in the Run-up to New Elections | LSE Latin America and Caribbean.” LSE Lat-
in America and Caribbean blog. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
latamcaribbean/2019/11/30/bolivia-after-morales-power-struggles-and-shifting-al-
liances-in-the-run-up-to-new-elections/.
Diaz-Cuellar, Vladimir. 2019. Requiem for the “Process of Change” in Bolivia. Mexico City: To-
ward Freedom. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from http://towardfreedom.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2020/01/Toward-Freedoms-Bolivia-Reader.pdf.
El Potosí, Redacción Central. 2021, 21 March. Bolivia vive “cansada” la confrontación política 




Erbol. 2020, 16 January. “Senado aprueba en grande y detalle la Ley de Prórroga de Manda-
to.” Educación Radiofónica de Bolivia. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://erbol.com.
bo/nacional/senado-aprueba-en-grande-y-detalle-la-ley-de-pr%C3%B3rroga-de-
mandato.
Erbol. 2021, 4 February. “Lima sostiene que reforma judicial ‘no es un fracaso’, sino está en 
‘pausa.’” Educación Radiofónica de Bolivia. Retrieved April 6, 2021 from https://erbol.
com.bo/nacional/lima-sostiene-que-reforma-judicial-%E2%80%98no-es-un-fraca-
so%E2%80%99-sino-est%C3%A1-en-%E2%80%98pausa%E2%80%99.
Escalera-Antezana, Juan Pablo et al. 2020. “Clinical Features of the First Cases and a Cluster 
of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Bolivia Imported from Italy and Spain.” 
Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease 35: 101653.
COMPOUNDING CRISES: BOLIVIA IN 2020
233
Farthing, Linda. 2019. “An Opportunity Squandered? Elites, Social Movements, and the Gov-
ernment of Evo Morales.” Latin American Perspectives 46(1): 212–29.
Farthing, Linda. 2021. “Mixed Results for the MAS in Bolivia Regional Elections.” NACLA. 
Retrieved April 5, 2021 from https://nacla.org/bolivia-regional-elections-mas.
Ferreyra Peñarrieta, Juan Carlos. 2020, 23 November. “Acciones Que Marcan Distancia-
miento.” Agencia de Noticias Fides. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://www.noti-
ciasfides.com/opinion/juan-carlos-ferreyra-penarrieta/acciones-que-marcan-dis-
tanciamiento.
Filgueira, Fernando, Luis Miguel Galindo, Cecilia Giambruno and Merike Blofield. 2020. 
América Latina ante la crisis del COVID-19: vulnerabilidad socioeconómica y respuesta so-
cial. Santiago: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Flores, Paola. 2020, 22 January. “Statues Toppled as New Bolivian Government Works to Erase 
‘personality Cult’ of Morales.” The Independent. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/bolivia-government-evo-mo-
rales-statue-stadium-la-paz-a9296466.html.
Fundación Jubileo. 2020. La Deuda Publica en Constante Crecimiento: Reporte de la Deuda 
Externa e Interna 2020. Serie Debate Publico N 83. La Paz-Bolivia.
Guarachi, Ángel. 2020, 15 January. “Gobierno Aclara Que Jeanine Áñez No Será Candidata a 
La Presidencia.” La Razón. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://m.la-razon.com/na-
cional/2020/01/15/gobierno-aclara-que-jeanine-anez-no-sera-candidata-a-la-presi-
dencia/.
Hinojosa, Josué. 2020, 5 May. “Bono Universal Se Paga Desde Hoy y Gobierno Admite 
Aglomeración.” Los Tiempos. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://www.lostiempos.
com/actualidad/economia/20200505/bono-universal-se-paga-hoy-gobierno-ad-
mite-aglomeracion.
Huarachi, Mildred. 2020, 29 July. “En multitudinaria marcha y cabildo: COB y movimiento 
sociales convocan a huelga general indefinida y bloqueo de caminos.” La Confeder-
ación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia “Bartolina Sisa. 
Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://www.bartolinasisa.org/2020/07/29/en-mul-
titudinaria-marcha-y-cabildo-cob-y-movimiento-sociales-convocan-a-huelga-gener-
al-indefinida-y-bloqueo-de-caminos/.
Human Rights Watch. 2020, 7 April. “Bolivia: Decreto sobre COVID-19 amenaza la lib-
ertad de expresión.” Retrieved April 1 , 2021 from https://www.hrw.org/es/
news/2020/04/07/bolivia-decreto-sobre-covid-19-amenaza-la-libertad-de-expres-
ion.
Hummel, Calla. 2017. “Disobedient Markets: Street Vendors, Enforcement, and State Inter-
vention in Collective Action.” Comparative Political Studies 50(11): 1524–55.
Hummel, Calla, V. Ximena Velasco Guachalla, Jami Nelson-Nuñez and Carew Boulding. 
2020. “Bolivia: Lecciones Sobre Los Primeros Seis Meses de La Pandemia de SARS-
CoV-2.” Temas Sociales (47): 98–129.
Hummel, Calla et al. 2021. “Poverty, Precarious Work, and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Lessons 
from Bolivia.” The Lancet Global Health 9(5): E579–81.
Hunter, Wendy and Robert Brill. 2016. “Documents, Please Advances in Social Protection and 
Birth Certification in the Developing World.” World Politics 68(2): 191–228.
IIES-JOM. 2020. Identificación de Causas Para El Incremento de Casos de COVID-19. Santa Cruz: 
Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School 
of Public Health. Comunicado de Prensa. Retrieved April 6, 2021 from https://www.
iies.uagrm.edu.bo/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Nota-de-prensa-COVID-19-23-
DE-JUNIO-2020-v7.pdf.
INE. 2021, marzo. “Tasa de Desocupacion: 2015-2021.” Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Estado 
Plurinacion de Bolivia. Ministerio de Planificacion del Desarrollo. Retrieved July 19 from 
www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/desocupacion/.
Infobae. 2020, 20 October. “Luis Arce Marcó Distancias Con Evo Morales: ‘Si Quiere Ayudar-
nos, Será Muy Bienvenido, Pero Será Mi Gobierno.’” Retrieved July 1, 2021 from 





Jimenez Pereyra, Alfredo. 2020, 5 April. “El coronavirus alimenta la desinformación en redes 
sociales.” Los Tiempos. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://www.lostiempos.com/
actualidad/mundo/20200405/coronavirus-alimenta-desinformacion-redes-sociales.
Karlinsky, Ariel and Dmitry Kobak. 2021. “The World Mortality Dataset: Tracking Ex-
cess Mortality across Countries during the COVID-19 Pandemic.” medRxiv: 
2021.01.27.21250604.
Kitroeff, Natalie and Mitra Taj. 2020, 20 June. “Latin America’s Virus Villains: Corrupt Of-
ficials Collude With Price Gougers for Body Bags and Flimsy Masks.” The New York 
Times. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/20/world/
americas/coronavirus-latin-america-corruption.html.
LAPOP. 2019. The AmericasBarometer Bolivia 2018/2019 Survey. Vanderbilt University.
Laserna, Roberto. 2020. Polarización y Conflicto: Midiendo los Riesgos de la Violencia. La Paz: 
Ediciones Ceres Press.
Los Tiempos. 2019, 30 December. “Evo desoye a grupos del MAS y definirá binomio el 19 
de enero en Argentina.” Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://www.lostiempos.com/
actualidad/pais/20191230/evo-desoye-grupos-del-mas-definira-binomio-19-ene-
ro-argentina.
Los Tiempos. 2020a, 19 January. “MAS elige a su binomio y Evo admite que hay prob-
lemas.” Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/
pais/20200119/mas-elige-su-binomio-evo-admite-que-hay-problemas.
Los Tiempos. 2020b, 4 September. “Este Domingo Inicia La Campaña Electoral Pública de 
Cara a Las Elecciones de Octubre.” Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://www.lost-
iempos.com/actualidad/pais/20200904/este-domingo-inicia-campana-electoral-pu-
blica-cara-elecciones-octubre.
Los Tiempos. 2020c, 5 May. “Largas Filas y Aglomeraciones Marcan El Inicio El Cobro Del 
Bono Universal.” Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://www.lostiempos.com/actual-
idad/pais/20200505/largas-filas-aglomeraciones-marcan-inicio-cobro-del-bono-uni-
versal.
Los Tiempos, 2020d, 19 October. “Áñez Felicita a Arce y Choquehuanca y Les Pide Gober-
nar Pensando a En Bolivia.” Los Tiempos. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://
www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20201019/anez-felicita-arce-choquehuan-
ca-les-pide-gobernar-pensando-bolivia.
Los Tiempos. 2020e, 9 November. “Morales Tras Ingresar a Bolivia: “No Dudaba Que Iba 
a Volver, Pero No Pensaba Que Fuera Tan Pronto”.” Retrieved July 8, 2021 from 
https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20201109/morales-ingresar-boliv-
ia-no-dudaba-que-iba-volver-pero-no-pensaba-que-fuera.
Los Tiempos. 2021, April 18. “Analistas ven debilitamiento del MAS y riesgos de ingobern-
abilidad.” Retrieved July 19, 2021 from https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/
pais/20210418/analistas-ven-debilitamiento-del-mas-riesgos-ingobernabilidad
Luna, Peter. 2020, 19 August. “Tribunal anula la clausura del año escolar y pide al Gobierno 
garantizar derecho a la educación” Opinión. Retrieved July 9, 2021 from https://www.
opinion.com.bo/articulo/pais/anulan-clausura-ano-escolar/20200819161528783092.
html
Madrid, Raúl L. 2012. The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Mamani, Gilber. 2020, 27 January. “Evo Morales and the Bolivian Spring.” Intercontinental 
Cry. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://intercontinentalcry.org/evo-morales-and-
the-bolivian-spring/.
Mamani Cayo, Yolanda. 2021, April 14. “El factor Evo y la persecución, entre las razones 
que explican la derrota del MAS.” Página Siete. Retrieved July 19, 2021 from https://




Massud Lozada, Christian. 2020, 20 October. “Las Protestas Callejeras En Tres Ciudades Su-
ben de Tono y Apuntan al Rol Del TSE y a Los Resultados Parciales de La Votación.” 
El Deber. Retrieved July 9, 2021 from https://eldeber.com.bo/santa-cruz/las-protes-
tas-callejeras-en-tres-ciudades-suben-de-tono-y-apuntan-al-rol-del-tse-y-a-los-resul-
tados-_205461.
Mealla, Luis. 2020, 19 January. “Con Posturas Opuestas, El MAS Define Su Binomio Este Do-
mingo En Argentina.” La Razón. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://www.la-razon.
com/nacional/2020/01/19/con-posturas-opuestas-el-mas-define-su-binomio-es-
te-domingo-en-argentina/.
Melendres Galvis, Miguel Angel. 2020, 6 September. “En La Paz Están Prohibidas Las Cam-
pañas Políticas Masivas Este Fin de Semana.” El Deber. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from 
https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/en-la-paz-estan-prohibidas-las-campanas-politi-
cas-masivas-este-fin-de-semana_199209.
Ministerio de Justicia. 2020. “El Titular de Justicia Propone Cinco Leyes Para Iniciar Una 
Reforma Judicial.” Retrieved April 6, 2021 from https://www.justicia.gob.bo/por-
tal/noticia_modal.php?new=oIOo.
Ministerio de la Presidencia. 2020a. Decreto Supremo 4199. 21 de Marzo 2020. La Paz: Gace-
ta Oficial del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. Retrieved July 17, 2021 from https://
www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-DS-N4199.html.
Ministerio de la Presidencia. 2020b. Decreto Supremo 4245. 28 de Mayo 2020. La Paz: Gace-
ta Oficial del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. Retrieved July 17, 2021 from https://
www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-DS-N4245.xhtml.
Ministerio de la Presidencia. 2020c. Decreto Supremo 4404. 29 de Noviembre 2020. La Paz: 
Gaceta Oficial del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. Retrieved July 17, 2021 from 
https://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-DS-N4404.xhtml.
Ministerio de la Presidencia. 2020d. “Gobierno Presentó Bono Universal, Amplió Bono Famil-
ia a Colegios Particulares y Anunció Créditos Blandos a Empresas Para Frenar La Cri-




Ministerio de Salud y Deportes de Bolivia. 2019. “¿Cómo Funciona El Sistema de Salud En 
Bolivia?” Retrieved April 5, 2021 from https://www.minsalud.gob.bo/3895-como-
funciona-el-sistema-de-salud-en-bolivia.
Molina, Fernando. 2020a, 14 August. “El Partido de Evo Morales Acepta El Aplazamiento 
de Las Elecciones Mientras Las Protestas Continúan En Bolivia.” El País. Retrieved 
July 8, 2021 from https://elpais.com/internacional/2020-08-14/el-partido-de-evo-
morales-acepta-el-aplazamiento-de-las-elecciones-mientras-las-protestas-continuan-
en-bolivia.html.
Molina, Fernando. 2020b, 24 October. “Los Factores Que Explican La Inesperada Victoria 
de Luis Arce En Bolivia.” El País. Retrieved July 9, 2021 from https://elpais.com/
internacional/2020-10-24/los-factores-que-explican-la-inesperada-victoria-de-lu-
is-arce-en-bolivia.html.
Montero, Baldwin. 2020, 31 January. “Candidatos Opositores al MAS Se Reúnen Presionados 
Por Demandas de Unidad.” La Razón. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://m.la-ra-
zon.com/nacional/2020/01/31/candidatos-opositores-al-mas-se-reunen-presiona-
dos-por-demandas-de-unidad/.
Muñoz Acebes, César. 2020, 11 September. La Justicia Como Arma. New York: Human Rights 
Watch. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://www.hrw.org/es/report/2020/09/11/
la-justicia-como-arma/persecucion-politica-en-bolivia.
Niedzwiecki, Sara and Santiago Anria. 2019. “Participatory Social Policies: Diverging Pat-
terns in Brazil and Bolivia.” Latin American Politics and Society 61(2): 115–37.
V. XIMENA VELASCO GUACHALLA • CALLA HUMMEL • JAMI NELSON-NUÑEZ • CAREW BOULDING
236
Opinión. 2020, 8 November. “En Medio de La Posesión, CC Protesta Por Los 2/3 de La Asam-
blea.” Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://www.opinion.com.bo/articulo/pais/me-
dio-posesion-cc-protesta-2-3-asamblea/20201108111711794796.html.
Órgano Electoral Plurinacional, Bolivia. 2020. Plublicacion de resultados. Elecciones Gene-
rales 2020. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://www.oep.org.bo/elecciones-genera-
les-2020/
Ortiz, Pablo. 2020, 6 September. “Las Redes Sociales Serán El Campo de Batalla En La Elec-
ción Presidencial 2020.” El Deber. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://eldeber.com.
bo/politica/las-redes-sociales-seran-el-campo-de-batalla-en-la-eleccion-presiden-
cial-2020_198874.
Quisbert, Carlos. 2021, March 8. “Expertos: «Dedazos» restaron al MAS y oposición se dis-
persa.” Pagina Siete. Retrieved july 19, 2021 from https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacio-
nal/2021/3/8/expertos-dedazos-restaron-al-mas-oposicion-se-dispersa-286706.html
Pagina Siete. 2020, 21 September. “Choquehuanca Dice Que ‘El Entorno’ Del Gobierno de 
Evo No Debe Volver.” Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://www.paginasiete.bo/na-
cional/2020/9/21/choquehuanca-dice-que-el-entorno-del-gobierno-de-evo-no-de-
be-volver-268813.html.
Pan American Health Organization. 2017. Health Financing in the Americas. Washington, 
DC. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://www.paho.org/salud-en-las-americas-
2017/?p=178.
Paredes Tamayo, Ivan. 2020, 11 October. “La Violencia En Campaña Electoral Perdura a 
Una Semana de Las Elecciones.” El Deber. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://el-
deber.com.bo/usted-elige/la-violencia-en-campana-electoral-perdura-a-una-sema-
na-de-las-elecciones_204149.
Peñaranda, Aylin. 2020, 21 July. La Policía levantó al menos 420 cuerpos en calles, vehículos 
y domicilios en cinco días. La Razon. Retrieved July 9, 2021 from https://www.la-ra-
zon.com/ciudades/2020/07/21/la-policia-levanto-al-menos-420-cuerpos-en-calles-
vehiculos-y-domicilios-en-cinco-dias/
Peñaranda, Raúl. 2020, 23 October. “Razones de La Victoria Del MAS.” Agencia de Noticias Fi-
des. Retrieved April 15, 2021 from https://www.noticiasfides.com/opinion/raul-pe-
naranda/razones-de-la-victoria-del-mas.
Peredo, Nelson. 2020, 23 January. “Siete Organismos Validan Transparencia de Comicios, 
Pero Cívicos Tienen Dudas.” Los Tiempos. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://www.
lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20201023/siete-organismos-validan-transparen-
cia-comicios-pero-civicos-tienen-dudas.
Ramos, Daniel. 2020, 8 November. “Bolivia’s Socialists Sweep Back to Power as Arce Sworn 
in as President.” Reuters. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/uk-bolivia-politics-inauguration-idUKKBN27O0H1.
Segales, Erika. 2020, 3 December. “Notables plantean tres áreas de trabajo para la reforma 
judicial.” Pagina Siete. Retrieved April 6, 2021 from https://www.paginasiete.bo/
nacional/2020/12/3/notables-plantean-tres-areas-de-trabajo-para-la-reforma-judi-
cial-276851.html.
Stefanoni, Pablo. 2020, 19 October. “El MAS Puede Ganar Sin Evo.” El País. Retrieved July 
8, 2021 from https://elpais.com/opinion/2020-10-19/el-mas-puede-ganar-sin-evo.
html.
Trigo, María Silvia, Anatoly Kurmanaev and José María León Cabrera. 2020, 23 July. “With 
Officials’ Backing, Dubious Virus Remedies Surge in Latin America.” The New York 
Times. Retrieved April 1, 2021 from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/world/
americas/chlorine-coronavirus-bolivia-latin-america.html.
Trigo, María Silvia, Anatoly Kurmanaev and Allison McCann. 2020, 22 August. “As Politi-
cians Clashed, Bolivia’s Pandemic Death Rate Soared.” The New York Times. Retrieved 
April 1 2021 from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/22/world/americas/vi-
rus-bolivia.html.
COMPOUNDING CRISES: BOLIVIA IN 2020
237
Unicef. 2020, June 11. “UNICEF plantea a Bolivia un trabajo conjunto para enfrentar desafíos 
de la educación por el COVID-19.” Unicef Bolivia. Retrieved July 19, 2021 from www.
unicef.org/bolivia/historias/unicef-plantea-bolivia-un-trabajo-conjunto-para-en-
frentar-desaf%C3%ADos-de-la-educaci%C3%B3n-por-el.
Unión Nacional de Instituciones para el Trabajo de Acción Social (UNITAS). 2020, 10 Sep-
tember. “Crisis política post electoral 2019: Análisis de la encuesta de percepción y 
sensación de la sociedad boliviana sobre la crisis de octubre y noviembre de 2019.” 
IPSOS.
Retrieved July 19, 2021 from https://redunitas.org/encuesta-73-de-la-poblacion-considera-
que-hubo-fraude-en-las-elecciones-de-2019/
Valencia, Germán Darío. 2009. “Crisis de representación, lucha por el poder y surgimiento de 
la oposición en la Bolivia reciente.” Debates 52: 35–42.
Velasco Guachalla, V. Ximena, Calla Hummel, Jami Nelson-Nuñez and Carew Boulding. 
2021. “Legitimacy and Policy during Crises: Subnational COVID-19 Responses in Bo-
livia” Forthcoming in Perspective in Politics. 
Wanderley, Fernanda, Marcela Losantos, Carola Tito and Ana Maria Arias. 2020. Los Impactos 
Sociales y Psicológicos Del Covid-19 En Bolivia. La Paz: Red ODSAL, UCB-IISEC, IICC.
Weyland, Kurt. 2013. “Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift: The Threat from the Populist 
Left.” Journal of Democracy 24(3): 18–32.
Wolff, Jonas. 2020. “The Turbulent End of an Era in Bolivia: Contested Elections, the Ouster 
of Evo Morales, and the Beginning of a Transition Towards an Uncertain Future.” 
Revista de ciencia política (Santiago) 40(2): 163-186
Zuazo, Aida. 2021, 2 February. “Campaña Electoral En Santa Cruz: La Violencia Comienza a 
Ganar Terreno Entre Golpes y Balines.” El Deber. Retrieved July 8, 2021 from https://
eldeber.com.bo/santa-cruz/campana-electoral-en-santa-cruz-la-violencia-comien-
za-a-ganar-terreno-entre-golpes-y-balines_218274.
Received: April 7, 2021
Accepted: July 10, 2021
V. Ximena Velasco-Guachalla is an assistant professor in the department of government at the 
University of Essex, UK. Her research focuses on the institutional sources of protest demands, 
attitudes towards democracy, elections in Latin America, and the informal sector across Latin 
American countries. Email: vv20291@essex.ac.uk
Calla Hummel is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University 
of Miami. Calla examines when and why informal workers organize and lobby the state and 
particularly in Bolivia, Brazil, and the United States. Email: chummel@miami.edu
Jami Nelson-Nuñez is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University 
of New Mexico. She studies the politics of service provision and the challenges of governments, 
communities and NGOs extending health, water and sanitation services to rural areas and 
marginalized peoples in Latin America. Email: jaminunez@unm.edu
Carew Boulding is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and a faculty 
fellow at the Institute of Behavioral Science at the University of Colorado Boulder. Her work 
focuses on political participation in developing democracies, especially in Latin America. Email: 
boulding@colorado.edu

